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How Composites Could Have Been Indispensable

Mereological Nihilism (just ‘Nihilism’ hereafter) is the thesis that no material object has proper parts; every material object is a simple. Recent developments in plural semantics have made it possible to develop and motivate this position. In particular, some have argued that the tools of plural reference and quantification enable us to systematically paraphrase true statements apparently about composites into statements that only concern simples ([1], [2], [6]).​[1]​ The motivation for Nihilism is twofold. First, if such paraphrases are indeed possible, it would be parsimonious to repudiate composition. Second, the existence of composites is assumed in various puzzles. For example, there is the puzzle of Theseus’ ship. If we endorse Nihilism, such puzzles do not arise ([2]: 428, [6]: 140).

Are composites really surplus to philosophical requirements? Given the resources of plural semantics, what must the world be like if composites are to be theoretically indispensable? I will describe and defend the possibility of a scenario in which mention of composites cannot be paraphrased (§2-3). We will therefore come to appreciate one way in which the world would have to be in order for composites to be required and for Nihilism to fail. 

My approach differs from existing attempts to establish the (possible) indispensability of composites. I will start by setting existing strategies aside (§1). This will help clarify both how my approach differs from them, and what is centrally at issue in any discussion of the scenario I describe. 

1. Existing strategies set aside

Let’s first set aside the obvious strategy of describing worlds of ‘gunk’, i.e. material objects all of whose parts have proper parts. At such worlds, apparent mention of composites cannot be paraphrased into statements that only concern simples, for there are no simples. The relevant issues here are complex and I will not engage with them at all (for further references see e.g. [3]). There is no gunk in the scenario I describe.

A second strategy is to focus on modal truths about composites, or truths about how composites change over time. There is no obvious way for the Nihilist to use the tools of plural semantics to paraphrase modal and temporal statements apparently about composites. Several attempts have been made (e.g. [2]: 426-8, [6] ch. 13), but critical pressure could no doubt be applied in this area. Again, the relevant issues are complex. In the scenario I describe, I will not focus on modal and temporal truths. The nature of persistence and modality are not relevant to the argument I’ll present.

If modal and temporal truths are set aside, Nihilists agree on the following: ‘C is F’ is paraphrased as ‘the Ss are F’, where ‘C’ is apparently the name of a composite and ‘the Ss’ is a plural name for what are apparently the simples that compose C. Hereafter I will ignore modal and temporal truths. I will only consider truths of the form ‘C is F’, where the only possible Nihilist paraphrase is ‘the Ss are F’. And I will only consider properties that can feature in such truths.

A third strategy is to describe a property of material bodies, F, which cannot be had by a simple or a plurality of simples. If ‘C is F’ is true, it cannot be paraphrased as ‘the Ss are F’, for no plurality of simples can be F. van Inwagen has maintained that mental properties are like this ([6]: 5-6). However, he offers no arguments for this conclusion, so it may be safely ignored. Van Inwagen is targeting a thesis that the Nihilist requires​[2]​: if F may be (apparently) had by composites of kind K, there can be K-wise arrangements of simples that are collectively F.​[3]​ While this thesis is not obviously true, it is difficult to see what would constitute a counter-example. Nihilists tend to assume that it is unproblematic (e.g. [1], [2]). In the absence of any reason to think this is problematic, and none has been given by van Inwagen, we may assume that it isn’t. By endorsing this thesis, we can advocate Nihilism, and thus achieve parsimony and avoid puzzle cases. I know of no reason to reject it. In the scenario I discuss, there are no properties that cannot be had by a plurality of simples. 

A fourth strategy is to focus on statements that apparently involve plural reference to, or plural quantification over, composites. Uzquiano has shown how these statements cause difficulties for the Nihilist ([5]). He considers a number of promising Nihilist responses, including use of plurally plural reference and quantification. As Uzquiano acknowledges, there is much work to be done on whether the responses he discusses are ultimately workable. I will not address any of the relevant issues. Let me just note that none of the Nihilist strategies Uzquiano discusses will help them to eliminate composites from the scenario I will discuss shortly. 

To my knowledge, the strategy that comes closest to my own is that of Merricks ([4]). I will finish this section by explaining why his strategy doesn’t work. In the next section I will make clear how my strategy differs from his. 

Merricks has argued that Nihilism is refuted if we can find a feature, F, of an (apparent) composite that is not “reduced to the collective activity or features of its parts” ([4]: 628). Suppose F may be truly ascribed to C. The idea seems to be that this instance of F is ‘irreducible’ in the relevant sense just in case it cannot be ‘reduced’ to the interrelations between and individual intrinsic natures of C’s (apparent) simple parts. So, it is contended that if an apparent composite, C, has such an ‘irreducible’ property, F, ‘C is F’ cannot be paraphrased into a statement about the nature of the simples that seem to compose C.

This strategy fails however we interpret ‘reduce’. Suppose our imagined instance of F does not ‘reduce’ to the interrelations between and individual intrinsic natures of C’s (apparent) simple parts. It does not follow that these simples cannot collectively instantiate F. For example, suppose that by ‘reducible to’ we mean ‘identical with’ (Merricks seems to have this in mind). So suppose F is not identical with any complex property formed from the interrelations between and individual intrinsic natures of C’s (apparent) simple parts. Being distinct from any such property does not prevent F from being collectively instantiated by these simples. Therefore the Nihilist may paraphrase ‘C is F’ as ‘the Ss are F’. Or consider interpreting ‘reducible to’ as ‘supervenient upon’. Exactly the same point can be made: F can be had by pluralities of simples, even though the instantiation of F doesn’t supervene on the interrelations between and individual intrinsic natures of C’s (apparent) simple parts. So, again, ‘C is F’ can receive the paraphrase ‘the Ss are F’. 

It seems likely that there are some reductive theses that would be incompatible with Merricks’ ‘irreducible’ properties. Consider the properties and relations that would be mentioned by an ideal science of the simples. Presumably, such a science would not mention properties and relations that we usually take to characterise higher mereological levels: feral, mother of and the like. It is plausible that the existence of Merricks’ ‘irreducible’ properties is incompatible with the thesis that the ideal science of the simples would give a complete inventory of all the properties and relations. But this thesis should not be confused with Nihilism, which only says that there are no composite material objects. 


2. A new strategy

I will now describe a possible world in which composites are theoretically indispensable. In this world, there is overwhelming evidence, of the usual kind, for two laws of nature respectively concerning incompatible properties P1 and P2. Furthermore, there are observable matters of fact which, together with these laws, entail that some (apparent) composite has P1 while its parts collectively have P2. Nihilism fails at this world: it is true that a composite has P1, but false that its parts collectively have P1. 

First, a few points about my strategy. To my knowledge, there are no actual examples of the kind of case I describe. This doesn’t matter, since my aim is only to show that composites are possibly indispensable. I will not present the case by using actual properties and adjusting the laws accordingly. Doing so would introduce irrelevant complications. Instead, I will present the case in terms of merely possible properties. I will say no more about them than is needed to state my argument. In specifying the nature of these properties I will not say anything exotic about them, nor will I beg the question against the Nihilist.

Let’s imagine this world from the perspective of its inhabitants. After investigating part of the material realm, we come to recognise two properties, P1 and P2, that are often collectively had by simples. Pre-philosophically, we are compelled to theorise as if these simples compose further objects. Some of these apparent composites often have either P1 or P2; statements of the form ‘C is P1’ are often true (though, according to the Nihilist, in need of paraphrase). We also have strong evidence, of the usual kind, that P1 and P2 are incompatible. Each of P1 and P2 is observed to have a range of characteristic effects, depending on what sort of thing has it and what other circumstances obtain. So, suppose we have naively recognised a kind of composite, KC. We also discover a kind of simple: KS. As we pre-philosophically see matters, some KCs are composed out of KSs. In the normal way, we discover laws governing the way a KC behaves when it is P1. And, again in the normal way, we discover laws governing the way KSs behave when they are collectively P2. For example, where KS* is another kind of simple, we discover that:

LS:	In circumstances C: if a KS* is proximate to some KSs, then that KS* is F iff those KSs are P2.​[4]​

LS is the law we posit to account for what makes KS*s F under circumstances C. It is what we appeal to in order to explain why a KS* is F in C. 

Furthermore, we discover this law:

LC:	In circumstances C: If a KS** is proximate to a KC, then that KS** is G iff that KC is P1.

LC is the law we posit to account for what makes KS**s G under circumstances C. It is what we appeal to in order to explain why a KS** is G in C. 

Now, finally, imagine that one day we make the following complex observation, call it O: 

(1) a KC is in circumstances C, 
(2) it is made from KSs, which are thereby in C, 
(3) KS**s proximate to the KC are G, 
(4) KS*s proximate to the KSs are F. 

We have very good evidence for LS and LC, so we reason as follows. On the basis of (1), (3) and LC we conclude: 

(C1): 	the KC is P1. 

On the basis of (2), (4) and LS we conclude: 

(C2) 	the KSs are P2. 

We recall the following truth:

(I): 	P1 and P2 are incompatible. 

On the basis of (C1), (C2) and (I) we conclude: 

(C3): 	the KC is P1 but its simple parts are not collectively P1. 

If C3 is the correct conclusion to draw from O, Nihilism fails. ‘This KC is P1’ cannot be paraphrased as ‘these KSs are P1’, since the former is true but the latter is false. So, in this scenario, Nihilism fails and composites are indispensable.






There are ways to argue that composites are dispensable in the scenario described, and thus maintain Nihilism with respect to that world. However, none of these strategies are plausible. It is far more reasonable to suppose that a possible world has been described in which composites are theoretically indispensable. 

The argument of the previous section hinged on the co-possibility of LS, LC, I and O. My reason for endorsing their co-possibility was, to further clarify, as follows. We can easily imagine being in a world in which LS, LC and I are very strongly supported, in the normal ways, by all the available evidence. Furthermore, it easy to imagine that, once LS, LC and I are strongly established, we have observation O. Undoubtedly, this much is possible. I can see no reason to suppose that there couldn’t be overwhelming evidence for LS, LC and I, followed by observation O. Hereafter, I will assume that this is possible. Faced with O in this world, we would not be compelled to give up LS, LC or I. It is logically possible to maintain these three in the face of O. We need only be prepared to infer C1-3. Since we have very strong evidence for LS, LC and I, this seems like the correct response to O. So, prima facie, LS, LC, I and O are co-possible. 

The Nihilist must deny that LS, LC, I and O are co-possible, since C3 is a consequence of all four. So they must argue that O would provide a counterexample to (at least) one of LS, LC or I. Below I will argue that no such argument can be reasonably made. In each case, my reasoning is basically the same: justifying the claim that O provides a counterexample would have to involve supposing that we have better reasons to endorse Nihilism than we have to endorse a strongly empirically supported thesis. As noted, Nihilism is only motivated by considerations of parsimony and avoidance of puzzle cases. If that parsimony and avoidance can only be achieved by repudiating empirically supported theses, it surely cannot be attained legitimately. In the described scenario, the only reasonable option is to suppose that there are composites. 

Let’s look, in more detail, at the options for the Nihilist. Ultimately, they must block the inference of C3. The available strategies divide naturally into two: (1) block the inference of C3 from C1 and C2; (2) block the inference of either C1 or C2 from O.

Firstly, consider the strategy of blocking the inference of C3 from C1 and C2. To do this, the Nihilist must argue against I. Presumably, this is only possible by arguing that O provides a counterexample to I. Up until the weird result of O, there were all the usual indications that P1 and P2 are incompatible. So the Nihilist must argue that O reveals a counterexample to I: the KSs are both P1 and P2. As far as I can tell, the only available argument is as follows. First, it is claimed that an (apparent) composite cannot have a property that isn’t collectively had by its simple parts. Call this thesis: N. The Nihilist must argue from N, C1 and C2 to the negation of I: Given C1 and N, it follows that the KSs are P1. Given C2, it follows that the KSs are P1 and P2. So P1 and P2 are compatible, which refutes I. Presumably, they must argue for C1 and C2 as above: they are deduced from O, LC and LS. 

The weakness in this strategy is N. Why should we endorse it? It is neither obviously true nor obviously false. We can understand composition and collective instantiation without thereby being compelled to accept N. The only reason to endorse N, it seems, is that it is required by Nihilism. So N is as well motivated as the position it makes possible. Recall, though, the motivation for Nihilism. It is a parsimonious position that would save us having to address various puzzles. Now, it is possible to have strong empirical evidence that two properties are incompatible. For example, prior to O, there might have been all the usual indications that P1 and P2 are distinct determinates of a shared determinable. We face a choice. Do we endorse N and argue against I as above? That would achieve the advantages of Nihilism but would involve denying a strongly empirically supported claim. Or do we endorse I and conclude, as in section 2, that Nihilism fails? It is clear that we should opt for the latter. In our imagined scenario, the advantages of Nihilism cannot be legitimately achieved.​[5]​ 

Next, consider the second strategy above: blocking the inference of either C1 or C2 from O. Let’s consider C2 first. If C2 is blocked, the Nihilist is free to suppose that the KSs and the KC are both P1, and thus that C3 is false and C1 can receive the required paraphrase. C2 is inferred from O and LS. To block C2, the Nihilist would have to argue that there are counterexamples to LS, and thus that it is not a law. On what grounds can the Nihilist deny that LS is a law? Presumably only by arguing that O provides a counterexample. Up until the weird result of O, there were all the usual indications that LS is a law. So, they must argue that O reveals a counterexample to LS: the KSs are not P2, but proximate KS*s are F. The latter is straightforwardly established by observation (O(4)). An argument is required for denying that the KSs are P2, i.e. for denying C2. So, to show that LS is not a law and thus that C2 cannot be deduced from O, what the Nihilist requires is, simply, an argument against C2. 

As far as I can tell, the only available argument is as follows. First, N is endorsed. The falsity of C2 doesn’t follow from N alone. What’s required is the premise that the observed KC has some property incompatible with P2. Presumably, the Nihilist can only establish this by arguing that the KC is P1 (i.e. C1). And presumably they can only establish C1, as above, by deducing it from O and LC. So, given C1 and N, the falsity of C2 can be deduced. 

Again, the weakness is N. We face a choice between endorsing N or the claim that LS is a law. Recall the only reason to endorse N: it is required by Nihilism, which is parsimonious and avoids puzzle cases. Consider our reasons to believe that LS is a law. Before O, there was strong empirical evidence, of the usual kind, that LS is a law. LS is required to account for why the proximate KS*s are F. If O is interpreted as revealing a counterexample to LS, we are left with no account of why the KS*s are F. We cannot suppose that some other feature of our scenario is responsible. For example, we can’t suppose that, in cases such as that revealed by O, KCs that are P1 make proximate KC*s F. That is, we cannot endorse:

LS*:	In circumstances C: if a KS* is proximate to some KSs, then that KS* is F iff those KSs are P2 or the KSs (apparently) compose a KC that is P1.

O is compatible with counterexamples to LS*: there could be occasions on which KCs are P1 but proximate KS*s are not F. The same goes for other attempts to pursue the same strategy. The alternatives for the Nihilist are to suppose that nothing accounts for why the KS*s are F, or that something as yet undetected accounts for it. The former would be intolerable if observations like O were common. The latter is poorly motivated wishful thinking. So, if the choice is between N and the claim that LS is a law, it is clear that we should opt for the latter. To sum up, there is no adequate way for the Nihilist to block C2. 

All the same points can be made regarding an attempt to block C1. If C1 is blocked, the Nihilist is free to suppose that the KC and the KSs are both P2, and thus that C3 is false and C2 doesn’t prevent the required paraphrase of ‘the KC is P2’. C1 is inferred from O and LC. As above, the Nihilist would have to suppose that O reveals a counterexample to LC, i.e. that the KC is not P1 but proximate KS**s are G. Again, the latter is established by O. The only available argument for the former parallels the above. First, N is endorsed, from which it follows that no KC can have a property that isn’t collectively had by the simples (apparently) composing it. Second, the Nihilist must argue that the KSs have some property incompatible with P1. Presumably, this can only be established by arguing that the KSs are P2, which could only be established by arguing that it follows from O and LS. 

This argument is as weak as the parallel argument above, and for exactly the same reasons. I won’t repeat those reasons. The basic idea, of course, is that without LC, we cannot account for why the KS**s are G. 

An extra objection can now be brought to bear. To block C2, the Nihilist must endorse LS. To block C1, the Nihilist must endorse LC. But choosing between LS and LC would be arbitrary. So choosing either strategy would involve an arbitrary choice. Theoretically, it would be preferable to avoid having to make such a choice. One obvious way is to endorse LS and LC and reject Nihilism. 
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^1	  I will assume here that the general strategy of giving paraphrases is legitimate. All I will assume about the relation between an ordinary statement and its paraphrase is that, necessarily, the latter is true iff the former is true. 
^2	  Note that the restriction of the previous paragraph is in force.
^3	  Of course they also need the stronger thesis if an (apparent) composite of kind K is F, then its K-wise arranged (apparent) simple parts are collectively F. This is not at issue at the moment.
^4	  Here ‘proximate’ just avoids the need for another schematic letter.
^5	  Note that N is distinct from the thesis at issue in my discussion of van Inwagen above. There the relevant thesis was: if F may be (apparently) had by composites of kind K, there can be K-wise arrangements of simples that are collectively F. Van Inwagen gives us no reason to reject this thesis. In my imagined scenario, we have good reasons to reject N.
